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Abstract
We examine whether the pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) a¤ects the
prospects of global free trade di¤erently than the pursuit of Customs Unions (CUs).
Our analysis is driven by a fundamental di¤erence between these two types of prefer-
ential trade agreements (PTAs): while CU members impose jointly optimal common
tari¤s on non-members, members of an FTA adopt individually optimal external tar-
i¤s. This implies that (a) FTAs are relatively more exible than CUs since an FTA
member is free to undertake further trade liberalization with respect to non-members
whereas a CU member can do so only if all CU members wish to do the same and (b)
coordination during tari¤ setting allows CU members to pool their market power. In
our comparative advantage based three country framework, the formation of either
type of PTA induces the non-member to lower its external tari¤s due to the reduction
in the volume of exports owing from members to the non-member (we call this ex-
ternal trade diversion). While the pursuit of CUs prevents free trade from emerging
in equilibrium, the pursuit of FTAs does not. This key result is driven by the relative
exibility of FTAs; the higher market power of CUs by itself does not undermine the
objective of reaching global free trade. Even if CUs are prohibited from raising their
tari¤s above pre-existing levels, free trade still fails to obtain if the pursuit of PTAs
takes the form of CUs.
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1 Introduction
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are more popular than ever before while multilateral
trade liberalization seems to have come to a stand still. The ever increasing popularity of
PTAs can be gauged from the fact that as of 15 January 2012, 511 notications of PTAs
(counting goods and services separately) had been received by the GATT/WTO. Of these
notications, 319 PTAs are already in force with others scheduled for implementation in the
near future. By contrast, the last round of multilateral trade negotiations i.e. the Doha
Round failed to come to a fruitful conclusion despite eleven years of intense negotiations.
Economists and policy-makers have long suspected that the contrasting fortunes of these
two types of trade liberalization may be inter-related. More specically, there is widespread
concern that the formation of PTAs has served to undermine multilateral liberalization.
Our objective in this paper is to investigate this issue with a ner lens by comparing the
implications of the two most popular PTAs i.e. free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs
unions (CUs) for global free trade.1
As is well known, the central di¤erence between an FTA and a CU is that members of a
CU impose jointly optimal common tari¤s on non-members whereas FTA members adopt
individually optimal external tari¤s. This di¤erence in tari¤ setting behavior between
the two types of PTAs has two important consequences. First, while an FTA member
is free to enter into additional FTAs with non-member countries that do not include its
existing FTA partners, a CU member can do so only if all members agree to participate
in the new agreement. For example, the United States has signed several FTAs since the
ratication of NAFTA in 1995 that do not include Mexico and Canada as partners whereas
the enlargement of the European Union over the years has been subject to the approval of
all existing members. In other words, FTAs are more exible than CUs. Second, as was
noted in Bagwell and Staiger (1997a) and Bond and Syropolous (1996), the coordination
of tari¤s within a CU allows members to pool their market power, thereby leading them to
impose relatively higher external tari¤s than FTAs.
The objective of this paper is to isolate the implications of these fundamental di¤erences
between FTAs and CUs for the prospects of free trade in the global economy. Our approach
to the formation of PTAs follows that of Saggi and Yildiz (2010) and Saggi et. al. (2013)
under which PTAs emerge endogenously as the outcome of a game of trade liberalization
1Roughly 90% of the existing PTAs take the form of FTAs, with CUs comprising the rest (Freund and
Ornelas, 2010). However, the existing CUs do involve major trading areas of the world: the EU and much
of Latin America (where MERCOSUR resides).
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between three countries that are free to pick their PTA partners as well as their tari¤ levels.
We consider two games: one in which PTAs takes the form of an FTA and another where
they are CUs. In addition to deriving Nash equilibria of these games of PTA formation,
we isolate Nash equilibria that are stable or coalition proof. By this we mean that they are
immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations, where a coalitional deviation is said to be
self-enforcing if a proper subset of players in the deviating coalition have no incentive to
undertake a further deviation (see Bernheim et. al., 1987).
Our model addresses the important issue of when and why countries prefer to liberalize
preferentially as opposed to doing so multilaterally. By contrast, existing literature takes
one of two approaches: it either (i) takes PTAs to be exogenously given and compares
incentives for multilateral liberalization in their presence to those in their absence or (ii)
simply asks whether a pair of countries benet from entering into a PTA given that there
exists no trade agreement between them, a comparison that does not tell us much about
when and why they deliberately choose to exclude others from their mutual trade liberal-
ization. To address the exclusion incentive in a convincing manner, one needs a model that
gives all countries an active voice during negotiations so that one can determine whether
some countries prefers to exclude others from the trade agreement even though they them-
selves wish to be included. We provide such a model and use it to assess the strength of
the exclusion incentive under FTAs and CUs as well as the ability of member countries to
exercise it in equilibrium.
Building on a trading structure similar to that of Horn et al. (2010), we endogenize
the formation of PTAs in a three country comparative advantage based model in which
each country exports a unique good to the other two. The model identies a novel type
of tari¤ complementarity: when two countries form a PTA (either an FTA or a CU), the
excluded country nds it optimal to voluntarily reduce its tari¤s on member countries.2
As a result, PTA members benet not only from their mutual trade liberalization but also
from the unilateral liberalization that is induced in the non-member country. This nding
is reminiscent of the reciprocated unilateralism result of Krishna and Mitra (2005) who
showed that unilateral tari¤ liberalization by a (large) country can result in reciprocal
tari¤ reduction by its smaller trading partner.3 In their model, unilateral liberalization by
2By contrast, existing literature has tended to focus on how the formation of a PTA can induce member
countries to voluntarily lower their external tari¤s on non-members. See Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 1997b
and 1998), Bond et al. (2004), and Estevadeordal et al. (2008).
3See also Coates and Ludema (2001) for a theory of trade policy leadership based on repeated interaction
between a large and a small country. In their model, a large country can undertake unilateral liberalization
in order to induce reciprocal trade liberalization by the small country.
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the large country encourages the formation of an export lobby in the small country which
then competes e¤ectively with the import-competing lobby to lower tari¤s and export taxes.
It is worth emphasizing that our model highlights the consequences of a type of trade
diversion that has generally been overlooked in the literature. Traditionally, trade diversion
is dened as the increase in trade between PTA members that occurs at the expense of
exports of non-members to the PTA, i.e., the traditional notion of trade diversion refers
to the reduction in the volume of imports that are sourced by PTA members from non-
members. By contrast, in our model, the formation of a PTA reduces the volume of exports
of PTAmembers to the non-member - a phenomenon we refer to as external trade diversion.
Indeed, such external trade diversion is precisely what makes it optimal for the non-member
to voluntarily lower its tari¤s on PTA members.4 To the best of our knowledge, our model
is the rst to capture the e¤ects of such external trade diversion on (1) the tari¤ structure of
non-member country (2) the welfare of members and non-members (3) the nature of PTAs
that arise in equilibrium and (4) the implications of FTAs and CUs for global free trade,
issues that cannot be adequately addressed by models that hold the tari¤s of non-members
constant (by taking them as exogenously given) or assume a trading structure under which
PTA formation does not a¤ect them.5
The fact that external trade liberalization by a CU member is conditional on the ap-
proval of other members implies that, relative to an FTA, a CU is less susceptible to
opportunistic unilateral deviations by member countries. To see this clearly, suppose there
are three countries (i; j, and k) and countries i and j have an FTA with each other. Then,
country i is free to negotiate a separate FTA with country k that does not include country
j. Such a pattern of bilateral FTAs is usually referred to as a hub and spoke arrangement,
with country i as the hub and countries j and k as the spokes. By contrast, if countries i
and j are in a CU, the only way one of them can undertake further trade liberalization with
country k is if they both agree to reduce their common external tari¤, perhaps in return
for some tari¤ reductions on country ks part. As a result, a hub and spoke type of trading
arrangement is simply infeasible under a CU. We show that this crucial di¤erence between
a CU and an FTA has important consequences for multilateral trade liberalization. In
particular, in our three country model of symmetric countries, we nd that while free trade
4Indeed, in our model, this logic would also apply to unilateral liberalization by any country so long as
it is preferential in nature (i.e. applies only to one country).
5See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 1997b, 1998), Krishna (1998), Ornelas (2005a and
2005b), and Saggi and Yildiz (2010). In general, the literature has tended to focus on the reduction of
market access experienced by non-members due to the formation of a PTA.
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obtains as the unique stable outcome when the alternative to multilateral liberalization are
bilateral FTAs, such is not the case when the alternative takes the form of CUs: under the
latter scenario, a CU between two countries emerges as the stable outcome even though
all three countries are symmetric. Thus, in our model, CUs undermine global free trade
whereas FTAs do not even though the exclusion incentive exists under both types of PTAs
in the sense that the welfare of members of both types of PTAs is strictly higher than that
under free trade.
We employ a three stage game. In the rst stage, each country simultaneously announces
the names of countries with whom it wants to sign a PTA. Here it is important to note
that we employ a game of announcements or proposals for a PTA link. In our game, a
country does not announce in favor of a specic trade agreement but rather names partners
with whom it wants to form a PTA (FTA or CU). If no announcements match or the only
matching announcement is in favor of no agreement, then no agreement would prevail. A
bilateral PTA would form if and only if two countries announce each othersnames and
there is no other matching announcement. In the FTA game, due to independent external
tari¤ determination, there is a possibility of two independent FTAs (where the hub country
has an independent FTA with each of the spoke countries while spoke countries do not have
an FTA with each other) and this would arise (i) if a country (this country would be hub)
announces in favor of signing an FTA with the other two countries while (ii) the other
two countries (they would be spokes) announce only in favor of signing an FTA with the
former country (not with each other). Finally, free trade would emerge if all countries
announce in favor forming a PTA with all the other countries. Next, given the trade policy
regime, countries choose their optimal tari¤s. In the nal stage of the game, production,
consumption and international trade take place.
To understand the intuition behind this key result, rst consider the game where PTAs
take the form of FTAs. Suppose all countries (say i, j and k) announce in favor forming
a PTA with all the other countries. Under such a case, due to exclusion incentives, two
of these countries (say i and j), taking the announcement of their complement as xed
(i.e. country k still announces in favor of an FTA with i and j), would jointly deviate to
announcements where they only call in favor of an FTA with each other. For this deviation
to be self enforcing, a proper subset of the initially deviating countries (means i or j) should
not have an incentive to further deviate to another announcement, taking the announcement
of complement (country k) as xed. However, each of the initially deviating country (i or
j) has an incentive to further deviate to an announcement in favor of FTAs with both
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countries since being a hub is better than being an FTA member. Therefore, the initial
deviation is not self-enforcing and thus free trade is coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under
the FTA game. By contrast, due to common external tari¤ determination in the CU game,
announcing in favor of a CU with the other two countries is tantamount to announcing in
favor of global free trade. Since two independent CUs (a hub and spoke type arrangement)
is not even feasible, the above explained further announcement deviation would not happen
and thus the initial deviation would be self-enforcing. Thus, free trade fails to be stable and
a bilateral CU arises as the unique stable equilibrium of the CU game. As a result, whereas
the exclusion incentive is reected in the equilibrium of the CU game, it goes unexpressed
in the FTA game due to the lure of a hub and spoke arrangement and the exibility that
FTA members have.
To isolate the market power e¤ect of a CU from their relative lack of exibility, we
also consider a scenario where CU members are not allowed to raise their tari¤s above pre-
existing levels. This experiment is also well motivated on policy grounds: Article XXIV of
GATT the key clause that sanctions PTAs in the WTO forbids member countries of a
PTA from raising tari¤s on non-members. When CUs are constrained in this manner, we
nd that they continue to arise as a stable equilibrium thereby preventing the realization
of global free trade. Thus, the restriction on external tari¤s mandated by Article XXIV
simply serves the soften the impact of a CU on outsiders; it does not eliminate the exclusion
incentive that gives rise to the CU in the rst place. Thus, it is the relative exibility of
FTAs over CUs that helps the prospects of global free trade and not their weaker market
power.
2 Trade model
Our model of trade agreements is an adapted version of the two-country model of Horn,
Maggi, and Staiger (2010). We consider a perfectly competitive world with three large
countries: z = i; j; and k and three (non-numeraire) goods: g = I, J , and K and a
numeraire good v0. On the demand side, the representative citizens utility function is
linear in the numeraire good and separable in the non-numeraire goods:
U(v; v0) = u(v) + v0; (1)
where v = [vI ; vJ ; vK ] is the consumption vector for the three non-numeraire goods, v0
denotes the consumption of the numeraire good, and u(v) is quadratic and additively
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separable in the three non-numeraire goods. The demand for good g in country z is then
given by
dgz(p
g
z) =   pgz: (2)
where pgz denotes the consumer price of good g in country z. Assuming that the population
in each country is a continuum of measure one, we can write the consumer surplus associated
with good g in country z as:
CSgz (p
g
z) = u
g
z[d
g
z(p
g
z)]  pgzdgz(pgz) (3)
On the supply side, as in Horn et. al. (2010), labour (l) is the only factor of production
which is employed in the production of the numeraire good that is produced one-for-one
from labor. The supply of labor is assumed to be large enough that the numeraire good is
always produced in a positive amount; therefore the equilibrium wage is equal to one.
Each non-numeraire good is produced from labor with diminishing returns. In partic-
ular, we assume the following production function for non-numeraire good g in country
z: Qgz =
p
2gzlg, where Q
g
z is the production of good g in country z and lg is the labor
employed in the production of good g. The supply function of good g in country z is as
follows:
sgz(q
g
z) = 
g
zq
g
z (4)
where qqz denotes the producer price for good g in country z.
We assume that there exists a symmetric comparative advantage structure across coun-
tries: Ii = 
J
j = 
K
k = 1 +  while 
J
i = 
K
i = 
I
j = 
K
j = 
I
k = 
J
k = 1. In other
words, each country has a comparative advantage in one good while having a comparative
disadvantage in the other two goods: each country exports the good that is indexed by the
same uppercase letter as the identity of the country. For example, country i exports good
I while importing good J from country j and good K from country k. Thus, there are two
competing importers for each non-numeraire good and the model is Ricardian in nature
with diminishing returns in the production of each good. Country zs producer surplus in
good g as follows:
PSgz (q
g
z) =
Z
sgz(q
g
z)dq
g
z =
1
2
gz(q
g
z)
2 (5)
As a representative scenario for all goods and countries, consider good I (i.e. the good
in which country i is has a comparative advantage). Let tji be the tari¤ imposed by country
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j on its imports of good I from country i.6 Given that all countries are large, world price
of good I depends on the tari¤s chosen by countries j and k but to simplify notation we
suppress the dependence of prices on tari¤s and simply denote the price of good I by pIi .
Due to the absence of any tari¤ in country i on good I, the consumer and producer
prices of good I in country i are equal: qIi = p
I
i . As there is no domestic taxation for the
import competing sectors, producer and consumer prices are also equal: qgi = p
g
i , where
g 6= I. Finally, ruling out prohibitive tari¤s yields the following no-arbitrage conditions for
good I:
pIj = p
I
i + tji and p
I
k = p
I
i + tki (6)
Let mIj and m
I
k be the imports of good I by countries j and k:
mIj = d(p
I
j)  sIj(qIj ) and mIk = d(pIk)  sIk(qIk) (7)
Similarly, let xIj and x
I
k denote country is exports (of good I) to countries j and k where
xIj = s
I
i (q
I
i )  d(pIi ) (8)
and
xIk = s
I
i (q
I
i )  d(pIi ) (9)
The equilibrium world price of each traded good g is determined by the market clearing
conditions. Market clearing for good I requires that country is export to a country equals
the imports of that country:
xIz = m
I
z where z = j; k (10)
Before proceeding with the derivation of optimal tari¤s, it is useful to highlight some
important features of the model. Since each country exports a unique good in the model,
a countrys tari¤ on one of its trading partners has no impact on the volume of its im-
ports from its second trading partner. This implies that a countrys external tari¤s are
independent of one another (since they apply to di¤erent goods, each with its own demand
function).7 Second, if two countries liberalize trade only towards one another, they import
more from each other and start exporting less to the third country a phenomenon which
we call external trade diversion. As we will see below, this reduction in the volume of
6We assume that tari¤ revenues for each good are redistributed unifomly to all individuals.
7One consequence of this feature is that the MFN principle of non-discrimination plays no role in our
model. Discriminatory tari¤s obtain in our model if two countries choose to liberalize on a preferntial
basis.
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exports to the third country in turn has implications for its optimal tari¤s.
Country zs welfare is dened as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and
tari¤ revenue over all goods:
wz =
X
g
CSgz (p
g
z) +
X
g
PSgz (q
g
z) +
X
h=j;k
tzhm
H
z (11)
In the absence of any trade agreement, each country chooses its tari¤s to maximize its
welfare. To derive optimal tari¤s, we follow the approach of Feenstra (2004) and Broda et.
al (2008). Consider country ks tari¤ problem. Di¤erentiating wk with respect to tki, we
obtain:
@wk
@tki
= tki
@mIk
@pIk
@pIk
@tki
 mIk
@pIi
@tki
(12)
The rst term of the above rst order condition is the e¢ ciency cost of the tari¤ (i.e. the
marginal deadweight loss from the tari¤) while the second term is the terms of trade e¤ect,
that is, the reduction in the price of good i that accrues to country i (pIi ) multiplied by the
quantity of country ks imports from country i. The optimal ad-valorem tari¤ is computed
where (12) equals zero:
@wk
@tki
= 0) tki
pIi
=
@pIi
@tki
mIk
pIi
@mIk
@pIk
@pIk
@tki
(13)
The above expression can be interpreted in two di¤erent ways. Note rst that sincemIk = x
I
k
we must have
@mIk
@pIk
@pIk
@tki
=
@xIk
@tki
Substituting this into (13) shows that country ks optimal ad-valorem tari¤ equals the
inverse of the elasticity of the export supply curve of country i to country k, denoted by
"ik:
tki
pIi
=
1
"ik
=

@xIk
@pIi
pIi
xIi
 1
(14)
For an alternative interpretation of the optimal tari¤, we can rearrange (13) and write
the optimal tari¤ formula for country k as follows:
tki
pIi
=
1
Ik
@pIi
@tki

@pIk
@tki
 1
where Ik =
@mIk
@pIk
pIk
mIk
(15)
As can be seen from above, the optimal tari¤ is also equal to the inverse of the elasticity
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of import demand of good I in k (Ik), times the ratio of the change in the relative world
price and domestic price of imports. Given that import demand elasticity Ik < 0, the
fact that country ks tari¤ on good I drives down the local price of the good in country i
(i.e. @p
I
i
@tki
< 0) while raising it locally ( @p
I
k
@tki
> 0), the optimal tari¤ imposed by country k
is positive. Note that the term @p
I
i
@tki
captures the terms of trade gain of the tari¤ since it
informs us how country ks tari¤ on good I a¤ects the price collected by country i while
@pIk
@tki
refers to the pass through of the tari¤ since it tells us how the domestic price of good
I in country k varies with its tari¤ on country i.8
Using the demand and supply functions in equations (2) and (4) as well as equations
(6) through (10), the equilibrium prices of good I in country i and in importing country j
equal:
pIi =
3  2
X
z 6=i
tzi
+ 6
and pIj =
3  2tki + (4 + )tji
+ 6
(16)
As is clear from equation (16), the price of good I in country i decreases in the degree of
comparative advantage  (supply e¤ect) and the tari¤s it faces in export markets (terms
of trade e¤ect). Similarly, the prices of good I in country j increases with its own tari¤
whereas it decreases with the tari¤ of the rival importer (i.e. country k). Using the above
price equations, we can explicitly calculate the terms of trade gain and the pass through
of import tari¤s the tari¤s.9 We have:
@pIi
@tji
=
@pIi
@tki
< 0 (17)
i.e. the tari¤s imposed by countries j and k lower the price collected by country is exporters
and
@pIj
@tji
=
@pIk
@tki
< 1 (18)
i.e. the pass through from tari¤s to local prices in importing countries is incomplete i.e.
the local price in a country does not increase one-to-one with its import tari¤.
The rst order condition in (12) can be written as:
@wk
@tki
=
2[  tki(+ 4)(+ 8) + 4tji]
(+ 6)2
(19)
8Broda et al. (2008) provide evidence that the importers with market power indeed use it in setting
their non-cooperative trade policy.
9Using the prices in (16), the volume of trade as a function of tari¤s can be easily calculated.
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It is immediate from the above rst order condition that we have positively sloped reaction
functions, i.e., tari¤s imposed by di¤erent countries on the same good (i.e. their common
import) are strategic complements in our model:
@tki
@tji
> 0 (20)
The intuition for why tari¤s of di¤erent countries end up being strategic complements in
our model is easy to see: an increase in the tari¤ country j imposes on country i increases
the volume of country is exports to country k thereby increasing the latters ability to
manipulate its terms of trade. Simultaneous solution of rst order conditions for countries
j and k leads to the following optimal Nash tari¤s (which are equal due to symmetry):
tji = t

ki = t
 =

2 + 12+ 28
(21)
3 Endogenous preferential trade agreements
We now describe our three stage game of trade liberalization. In the rst stage, each
country simultaneously announces the names of countries with whom it wants to sign a
PTA. This stage determines the underlying trade policy regime. Next, given the trade
policy regime, countries choose their optimal tari¤s. Finally, consumption, production and
international trade take place. As noted before, a key di¤erence between the two types
of PTAs is the relative exibility of FTAs: while an FTA member is free to sign another
FTA with an existing non-member without needing consent of an existing FTA partner, a
CU member cannot do so due to the requirement of common external tari¤s. To capture
the implications of this important di¤erence between an FTA and a CU, we compare the
equilibrium outcome of the two games, beginning with the FTA game.
3.1 Free trade agreements
In the rst stage of the FTA game, each country simultaneously announces the names of
countries with whom it wants to sign a free trade agreement (FTA). Here it is important
to note that we employ a game of announcements or proposals for a PTA link. In our
game, a country does not announce in favor of a specic trade agreement but rather names
partners with whom it wants to form a PTA (FTA or CU).(Footnote here maybe sta-
ting that announcing in favor of a specic agreement does not make too much
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sense). Country is announcement is denoted by i and its strategy set 
i consists of
four possible announcements: 
i = ff; g; fj; g; f; kg; fj; kgg, where f; g denotes an
announcement in favor of no FTA with either trading partners, fj; g in favor of an FTA
with only country j; f; kg in favor of an FTA with only country k; and fj; kg in favor of
FTAs with both of them.
The FTA game can yield the following outcomes: (i) if no two announcements match
or the only matching announcements are f; g, then no agreement hi would prevail; (ii)
an FTA between countries i and j denoted by hiji would form if and only if two countries
announce each othersname and there is no other matching announcement: i.e., i 2 j and
i 2 j while i =2 k and/or k =2 i and j =2 k and/or k =2 j; (iii) two independent FTAs
(hub and spoke trading regime) in which i is the common member denoted by hij; iki (or
simply hihi) are formed if and only if country i announces in favor of signing an FTA with
countries j and k while countries j or/and k announce only in favor of signing an FTA
with country i: i.e. j 2 i and i 2 j and k 2 i and i 2 k while k =2 j and/or j =2 k
and (iv) free trade, denoted by hF i, would obtain if and only if all countries announce each
othersnames.10
In what follows, we allow countries to undertake coalitional deviations and isolate Nash
equilibria that are coalition proof. Following Dutta and Mutuswamis (1997) terminology,
we refer to coalition proof Nash equilibrium as stable equilibrium. Following Bernheim
et. al. (1987): "... an agreement is coalition-proof if and only if it is Pareto e¢ cient
within the class of self-enforcing agreements. In turn, an agreement is self-enforcing if
and only if no proper subset (coalition) of players, taking the actions of its complement as
xed, can agree to deviate in a way that makes all of its members better o¤." Therefore,
a Nash equilibrium is stable if and only if it is immune to all self-enforcing coalitional
deviations. The application of this solution concept is eminently desirable in the present
context since countries considering bilateral trade agreements certainly have the capacity
to communicate with one another without necessarily having the ability to make binding
commitments regarding their plans.
If two countries form an FTA hiji, they remove their tari¤s on each other (tij = tji =
10Note that the FTA hiji obtains so long as country i and j call only each other, regardless of the nature
of country ks announcement. Thus, if i = fj; g and j = fi; g, then country k would be indi¤erent
between k = f; g, fi; g, f; jg and fi; jg because its announcement has no bearing upon the outcome.
Under such a situation, we assume that country k makes the most parsimonious announcement among
the three, k = f; g. The intuitive justication for this assumption is that an FTA proposal is likely to
be costly in the real world and a country that receives no proposals from others would be better o¤ not
making any proposals of its own.
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0) and impose their individually optimal external tari¤s on the non-member country by
solving:
@wi
@tik

tij=0
= 0 and
@wj
@tjk

tji=0
= 0 (22)
Since member countries i and j are competing importers of good K, the elimination of
their internal tari¤s due to the FTA has no impact on their tari¤s on imports of good K
and thus the optimal external tari¤ of FTA members, denoted by t(ij), is the same as that
under no agreement, denoted by t. We have t(ij) = t.11
On the other hand, since countries compete over imports, the formation of an FTA
between two countries changes the rst order conditions of the tari¤ choice problem of the
non-member country. We have:
@wk
@tki

tji=0
=
2[  tki(+ 4)(+ 8)]
(+ 6)2
(23)
Since we know from (20) that tari¤s on the same good imposed by di¤erent importers are
strategic complements, the reduction of tij and tji to zero induces country k to lower its
external tari¤ on the imports from country i and country j. We have:
tk(ij) =

(+ 4)(+ 8)
< t
We can now state:
Proposition 1: The external trade diversion caused by a bilateral FTA induces the
non-member to lower its tari¤s on members (i.e. tk(ij) < t) while it has no e¤ect on the
external tari¤s of members (i.e. t(ij) = t).
The general intuition behind the above proposition is as follows. Since the removal of
internal tari¤s under the FTA hiji leads to an increase in the imports of country j from
country i, the export supply curve of country i to country k shifts to the left. As a result,
the equilibrium world price of good I rises while the equilibrium exports of country i to
country k decline. Since export supply curves are linear in our model, the elasticity of
export supply curves of countries i and j facing country k rises due to the formation of the
bilateral FTA hiji:
"ik(ij)  "ik() = 2

> 0 (24)
11Thus, the model does not exhibit the type of tari¤ complementarity described in Bagwell and Staiger
(1997a, 1997b) and some other models of PTAs.
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which in turn implies that country ks optimal tari¤ on imports from countries i and j
under the FTA hiji is lower than its optimal Nash tari¤ t.
For an alternative interpretation of Proposition 1, consider the optimal tari¤ formula
in (15). Note that the FTA hiji leads to an upward movement along the import demand
curves of country k for goods i and j leading to a higher elasticity of import demand
(common due to symmetry). Thus, the removal of the internal tari¤s under the FTA hiji
leads to a lower terms of trade gain and a higher tari¤ pass through in country k:
@pIi
@tki
jtji=0>
@pIi
@tki
jtji=t and
@pIk
@tki
jtji=0>
@pIk
@tki
jtji=t
both of which tend to lower its optimal tari¤. Analogous reasoning explains why the two
spoke countries end up imposing lower tari¤s on each other relative to the status quo:
under the hub and spoke arrangement, each spoke exports more to the hub and less to the
other spoke relative to the status quo, which in turn lowers the ability of both spokes to
manipulate their terms of trade vis-à-vis one another.
Let country is welfare as a function of trade agreement a be denoted by wi(a) and let
wi(a  b) denote the di¤erence between country is welfare under trade agreements a and
b: wi(a  b)  wi(a)  wi(b). Also, let m denote a member country of the bilateral FTA
hiji so that m = i or j:
We establish the following result below:
Lemma 1: A pair of countries have an incentive to form a bilateral FTA and the
formation of such an FTA makes the non-member country worse-o¤.
First note that the formation of a bilateral FTA does not a¤ect the non-members
producer surplus in export markets since external tari¤s of FTA members are the same as
those under the status quo. Furthermore, since the external trade diversion caused by an
FTA lowers the non-members ability to manipulate its terms of trade vis-à-vis member
countries (which is reected in turn in its reduced external tari¤), the non-member is worse
o¤ relative to the status quo. Since aggregate world welfare increases due to the trade
liberalization undertaken by FTA member countries, we can conclude that the formation
of an FTA makes member countries better o¤ at the expense of the non-member:
wm(ij   ) > 0 > wk(ij   ) for m = i; j (25)
From the rst inequality above it immediately follows that, starting at no agreement hi,
two countries (say i and j) always have an incentive to announce each others name that
14
would lead to a deviation from no agreement hi to a bilateral FTA hiji.
Next, we examine the welfare of a member country m and the non-member country
under the FTA hiji relative to the hub and spoke trading regime hmhi where the hub
country has an independent FTA with each of the two spoke countries who do not have an
FTA with one other. As one might expect, taking the announcement of their complement
as xed, each member country (i or j) of an FTA hiji and the non-member country (k)
have incentives to jointly deviate to announcements where they call in favor of an FTA
with each other. This deviation would lead to a hub and spoke regime where deviating
FTA member becomes a hub that forms two independent FTAs:
wm(mh  ij) > 0 for m = i; j (26)
Such a move on the part of a member country of an existing FTA makes the other member
worse o¤:
wem(mh  ij) < 0 for m; em = i; j (27)
It is important to note that the source of the adverse impact on the pre-existing FTA mem-
ber that does not become the hub is the external trade diversion caused by the formation
of the second FTA which reduces the volume of exports owing from the non-member to
its market which in turn reduces its optimal external tari¤. The ip side of this result is
that it is better to be a spoke than to be a non-member under the FTA hiji:
wk(mh  ij) > 0 (28)
Finally, consider the welfare of individual countries under the hub and spoke regime
relative to free trade. We nd that while each spoke country is better o¤ under free trade,
the hub country is worse o¤:
wem(F  mh) > 0 > wm(F  mh) (29)
A comparison of hub country ms welfare under hmhi relative to hF i yields the following:
(i) the hub countrys producer surplus is equal under the two regimes since its producers
face zero tari¤s under both regimes and are a¤orded no protection in the home market (ii)
its domestic welfare is higher under hmhi relative to hF i since it benets from the positive
terms of trade e¤ects of tari¤s that the spokes impose on each other it is able to import
goods from both spokes at prices that are below those under free trade. As a result, the
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hub country is strictly better o¤ under relative to free trade.
To see why the spokes are worse o¤ under relative to free trade, it is su¢ cient to note
that aggregate global welfare is strictly higher under free trade. Given that the hub country
is strictly better o¤ relative to free trade and the fact that the welfare of the two spokes is
equal (due to symmetry), both spokes must be worse o¤. We are now ready to state one
of our key results (see the appendix for proof):
Proposition 2: Even though a pair of countries prefer a bilateral FTA to free trade
(i.e. wm(F   ij) < 0), the only stable equilibrium of the FTA game is free trade.
The key message of this result is that even though a pair of countries benet from
excluding the third country from their trade agreement, they are unable to exercise this
exclusion incentive in equilibrium. The forces that give rise to the exclusion incentive can
be understood as follows. Relative to free trade, each member country of an FTA has the
ability to manipulate its terms of trade vis-à-vis the non-member while also being able
to free ride on the terms of trade e¤ect of the non-members tari¤ on their FTA partner.
These benets of exclusion are somewhat tempered by the fact that the deviation from free
trade to an FTA results in member countries facing positive tari¤s in the non-members
market, although these tari¤s are lower than those under the status quo owing to the
external trade diversion caused by the FTA. However, the two positive e¤ects of exclusion
on FTA members dominate the negative e¤ect so that a pair of countries benet if they can
successfully exclude the third country from their trade agreement.12 It is worth emphasizing
the role that the exible nature of FTAs plays in ensuring that the exclusion incentive goes
unexercised in the FTA game. Since the formation of an FTA induces the non-member to
lower its tari¤s on members while leaving external tari¤s of countries that become FTA
members unchanged (Proposition 1), two countries have an incentive to exclude the third
country. However, since the most preferred arrangement of each country  i.e. being a
hub under a hub and spoke arrangement is permissible under FTAs and the non-member
prefers to be a spoke under a hub and spoke regime, no two countries are able to exclude the
third by forming a bilateral FTA. The lure of creating a hub and spoke arrangement ends
up undermining bilateral FTAs thereby delivering free trade as the only stable outcome.
What if countries pursue CUs instead of FTAs? Next, we examine this possibility.
12Of course, since world welfare is higher under free trade relative to an FTA, the gains that members
enjoy come at the expense of the non-member:
wk(ij   F ) < 0 (30)
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3.2 Customs Unions
Suppose the PTA under consideration is a CU as opposed to an FTA. As under the FTA
game, at the rst stage of the CU formation game each country announces the names of
countries with whom it wants to form a CU. Country is announcement is denoted by i
and its strategy set 
i consists of four possible announcements:

i = ff; g; fj; g; f; kg; fj; kgg (31)
where f; g denotes an announcement in favor of no CU with either trading partners,
fj; g in favor of a CU with only country j; f; kg in favor of a CU with only country
k; and fj; kg in favor of a CU that includes all three countries which is tantamount to
announcing in favor of global free trade.
The following policy regimes can arise in the customs union game: (i) no agreement hi
would prevail when no two announcements match or the only matching announcements are
f; g; (ii) a CU between countries i and j denoted by hijui would be formed if and only if
two countries announce each othersname and there is no other matching announcement:
i.e., i 2 j and i 2 j while i =2 k and/or k =2 i and j =2 k and/or k =2 j; (iv) free trade,
would obtain if and only if all countries announce the name of the other two countries.
Recall that the equivalent of a hub and spoke trading regime cannot arise under the CU
game due to the fact that CU members coordinate their external tari¤s.
Next, we consider the formation of a CU between countries i and j, denoted by hijui.
Like FTA members, CU members remove tari¤s on each other. However, unlike FTA
members, CU members impose a jointly optimal external tari¤ on the non-member. Under
the CU hijui members solve:
max
t
wi(ij
u) + wj(ij
u) subject to tij = tji = 0 (32)
As the CU forms, the common market becomes larger relative to their individual markets
and membersinternational market power increases. Since the terms-of-trade externalities
across members are internalized by a CU and tari¤s on the same good across countries are
complementary in our model, the optimum external tari¤s of members rise following the
formation of CU.13
To gain further insight, let mK be the total import demand of good K in countries i
13Olarreaga et al. (1999) provide evidence that the terms-of-trade externalities among Mercosurs mem-
bers were internalized in its external tari¤s.
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and j:
mK =
X
z=i;j

d(pKz )  sKz (qKz )

(33)
while xK denote the exports of goodK (from country k) to the common market of countries
i and j:14
xK = sKk (q
K
k )  d(pKk ) (34)
The equilibrium world price of good K is determined by the market clearing condition:
xK = mK (35)
Using the market clearing prices and quantities, the rst order condition for the welfare
maximization problem in (32) can be written as:
@[wi(ij
u) + wj(ij
u)]
@t
=
4[2  t(+ 2)(+ 10)]
(+ 6)2
= 0 (36)
Solving this yields the optimal tari¤ of the CU hijui:15
t(iju) =
2
2 + 12+ 20
(38)
Since both countries import the same good from the non-member country, the market
power e¤ect of a CU emphasized by Bagwell and Staiger (1997a) arises here. A CU allows
members to pool their market power and extract a larger terms of trade gain from the
non-member leading to an increase in their tari¤s:
t(iju) > t(ij) = t (39)
It is also immediate that since member countries reduce their internal tari¤s to zero, like
an FTA, a bilateral CU also induces the non-member to lower its tari¤s on members (and
14Note that with a CU we are back to two country set-up of Feenstra (1994) and Broda et al. (2008).
15It is straightforward to conrm that the optimal ad-valorem tari¤ of the CU equals the inverse of the
elasticity of country ks export supply curve:
t
pKk
=
1
"k(iju)
(37)
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exactly to the same level):16
tk(ij
u) = tk(ij) < t
 (40)
It is straightforward to establish that the external trade diversion caused by a CU has
qualitative similar e¤ects as an FTA:
Proposition 3: The formation of a CU induces members to raise their external tari¤s
(i.e. t(iju) > t) and the non-member to lower them: tk(iju) < t.
To see the general picture behind the above result more clearly, suppose that we start
with the status quo where all countries impose the optimal tari¤ t on each other. It
is obvious that the export supply of country k to the CUs common market lies to the
right of its individual export supply curves to the markets of countries i and j since it
applies to a common larger market. Similarly, following the formation of the CU hijui,
the common import demand of member countries is larger relative to individual import
demands. Therefore, market clearing under the CU hijui occurs at a lower pKk
xKk
ratio relative
to the status quo. Since export supply curves are linear, the elasticity of country ks export
supply curve falls due to the formation of the CU hijui. As a result, the optimal common
external tari¤ under CU hijui is higher than the individually optimal tari¤s of countries i
and j.
It is worth noting that Article XXIV of GATT requires PTA members to not raise
their external tari¤s on non-member countries. For now, we ignore this tari¤ restriction
imposed by Article XXIV and assume that a CU can impose its optimal tari¤s. At the end
of this section, we examine the implications of this tari¤ restriction on welfare and on the
prospects of global free trade.
Since CU members pool their market power, they impose higher external tari¤s than
FTA members and extract a larger terms of trade gain from the non-member. As a result,
the welfare of a CU member is higher than that of an FTA member:
wm(ij
u   ij) > 0 where m = i; j. (41)
Then, combining (25) and (41), we can argue that, relative to no agreement, member
countries are better o¤ under a CU while the non-member country is worse-o¤. This
implies that a CU is a Nash equilibrium since neither member country (i or j) has an
incentive to unilaterally change their announcements that would only lead to no agreement
16Thus, Proposition 1 holds regardless of whether the PTA is an FTA or a CU.
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hi:
wm(ij
u   ) > 0 (42)
Using a similar logic, since the non-member faces higher tari¤s in the export markets under
a CU relative to FTA while its external tari¤s are the same, the non-member country is
worse o¤ under a CU relative to an FTA:
wk(ij
u   ij) < 0 (43)
Combining (48) and (43), it follows that the non-member country is worse-o¤ relative to
free trade:
wk(F   iju) > 0 (44)
Therefore, free trade is also a Nash equilibrium since a country (say k) has no incentive to
unilaterally deviate from its announcement fi; jg to f; g that would result a deviation
from hF i to hijui. Finally, as in the FTA game, no agreement hi is a Nash equilibrium since
no country has an incentive to announce anothers name if the latter does not announce
its name in return.
Following our discussion of the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in the FTA game, it
is easy to see that the only two candidates for stable equilibrium of the CU game are a
bilateral CU hijui and free trade hF i. Which, if any, of these Nash equilibria are coalition-
proof? Consider free trade rst. As in the FTA game, since world welfare is the highest
under hF i, each country prefers hF i to hi and thus we can immediately rule out any
coalitional announcement deviations that would lead to a deviation from hF i to hi. The
only issue is, taking the announcement of their complement (country k) xed, whether two
countries (say i and j) have an incentive to coalitionally deviate from their announcements
fj; kg and fi; kg to fj; g and fi; g respectively, leading to a deviation from free trade hF i
to a bilateral CU hijui. In fact, we can show the following:
Lemma 2: The exclusion incentive is stronger for a CU relative to an FTA:
wm(ij
u   F ) > wm(ij   F ) > 0 (45)
The key di¤erence relative to the FTA game is that the joint deviation of countries i and
j from from their announcements fj; kg and fi; kg to the announcements fj; g and fi; g
(converting free trade hF i to a bilateral CU hijui) is now self-enforcing since neither of the
initially deviating countries (i or j) has an incentive to further deviate unilaterally, taking
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country ks announcement xed: k = fi; jg. Thus, since the initial joint announcement
deviation of two countries is self-enforcing, free trade hF i fails to be a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium under the CU game.
Finally, we know from (42) and (45) that countries i and j countries have no incentives
(unilaterally or coalitionally) to deviate from their respective announcements fj; g and
fi; g since such a move is not benecial. Thus, we have the following key result:
Proposition 4: The only stable agreement of the CU game is the bilateral CU hijui.17
The di¤erence in results reported in Propositions 2 and 4 is driven by the relatively
exible nature of FTAs compared to CUs. When two countries (i and j) jointly exclude
the third country from free trade under the FTA game, each member has an incentive to
further deviate from the bilateral FTA and sign an independent FTA with the third country
thereby making itself a hub. The existence of this further deviation acts as a deterrent for
the other initially deviating country (say country j) since it is worse o¤ as a spoke under
hihi relative to free trade and thus the initial joint deviation from free trade to a bilateral
FTA does not occur. However, unlike the FTA game, no such deterrent exists under the
CU game since a CU member cannot form an independent agreement with the external
country without the consent of its CU partner due to common determination of external
tari¤s. Therefore, our model suggests that the pursuit of PTAs is compatible with the goal
of achieving global free trade only when PTAs take the form of FTAs.
We now turn to isolating the implications of the pooling of market power under a CU
from their relative exibility compared to FTAs. We do this by holding the external tari¤
of the CU constant at the pre-existing level. This is well motivated experiment since Article
XXIV of GATT the key WTO clause that sanctions PTAs forbids member countries
of a PTA from raising tari¤s on non-members. In our model, in the absence of such a
restriction, CU members indeed raise their tari¤s on outsiders due to the pooling of their
market power whereas FTA members do not. What is the equilibrium outcome of the CU
game when CU members are unable to raise their tari¤s above the levels that prevail under
the status quo?
Let


iju

denote the CU between countries i and j when the tari¤ restriction of Article
XXIV binds. If CU members are prohibited from raising tari¤s on non-members, thus the
17This is in sharp contrast to the results obtained in the competing exporters model of Saggi et al.
(2013). When countries are competing exporters, while the pooling of market power exists under the CU,
external trade diversion and the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect in the non-member countrys market that
results from it do not arise and this weakens the exclusion incentive in that framework. As a result, in
Saggi et al. (2013) a CU simply does not arise in equilibrium when countries are symmetric in size.
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external tari¤s under a CU and FTA are equal:
ti(ij) = ti(iju) = t
 (46)
Given that they impose the same external tari¤s and face the same tari¤s in export markets,
member countries obtain the same welfare levels under a CU and an FTA i.e. wm(iju) =
wm(ij) form = i; j. It turns out that countries i and j still have incentives to jointly deviate
from from from their respective announcements fj; kg and fi; kg to the announcements
fj; g and fi; g (converting free trade hF i to a bilateral CU 
iju) even when the external
tari¤s are restricted by Article XXIV:
wm(F   iju) < 0 for m = i; j (47)
As before, this deviation is self-enforcing and thus free trade fails to be coalition-proof
under the restricted CU game. Thus, even when CU members are prevented from raising
their tari¤s on outsiders, a bilateral CU is still the unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
of the CU game. Thus, even when CU members are prevented from raising their tari¤s
on outsiders, a bilateral CU is still the unique stable equilibrium of the CU game. The
only consequence of the tari¤ restriction is that it replaces the unconstrained CU hijui by
the constrained CU


iju

. Thus, the restriction on external tari¤s of CU members fails to
further the cause of global free trade, even as it makes the resulting CUmore attractive from
a global welfare perspective by softening the adverse impact of the CU on the non-member
country.
In a recent paper, Mrázová, et al. (2013) compare CU formation with and without the
constraint on external tari¤s imposed by Article XXIV. In their multi-country oligopoly
model, holding constant the structure of the CU, the constraint imposed by Article XXIV
improves world welfare. But this positive e¤ect is counterbalanced by a negative compo-
sitional e¤ect since Article XXIV encourages the formation of more symmetric CUs and
thereby causes a greater volume of trade to be subject to tari¤s. In our model, the compo-
sitional e¤ect is absent since countries are symmetric in terms of economic fundamentals.
However, our primary focus is on how the endogenous choice between preferential and mul-
tilateral liberalization is a¤ected by the nature of the trade agreement (FTA versus CU)
under consideration and the e¤ects of the Article XXIV tari¤ constraint are less central to
our analysis.
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4 Conclusion
At a time when multilateral trade liberalization seems to have come to a grinding halt, the
question whether preferential trade agreements have a useful role to play in the multilateral
trading system seems to have acquired an even greater degree of urgency. After all, other
than unilateral trade liberalization, over the last decade or so PTAs appear to be the only
game in town for countries interested in undertaking reciprocal trade liberalization. Of
course, the concern that the pursuit of PTAs might undermine whatever appetite remains
in the global trading system for multilateral trade liberalization remains a real one.
In this paper, we attempt to isolate the implications of the two commonly occurring
PTAs for the prospects of multilateralism. The beginning point of our analysis is a well
understood di¤erence between FTAs and CUs: while CUmembers impose common external
tari¤s, each FTA member imposes external tari¤s of its own choosing. This di¤erence in
tari¤ setting behavior between the two PTAs implies that while FTA members have less
market power than CU members, they enjoy a greater degree of exibility in the sense that
they are free to enter into further agreements with outsiders whereas CU members can only
do so with consent of existing members.
An important result of this paper is that the formation of either type of PTA induces
the non-member to lower its tari¤s on PTA members: the external trade diversion i.e.
the reduction in the volume of exports owing from PTA members to the non-members 
reduces the ability of the non-member to manipulate its terms of trade thereby making it
optimal for it to lower its tari¤s. Thus, PTA formation not only benets members because
of the internal trade liberalization that they undertake but also because of the external
trade liberalization induced abroad.
The central result of the paper is that the more exible nature of FTAs (which in turn
emanates from independent external tari¤ setting on the part of members) helps in the
attainment of global free trade. Specically, the ability of an existing FTA member to
form an independent FTA with the non-member makes global free trade the only stable
equilibrium of our FTA game. By contrast, the only stable equilibrium of the CU game is
a bilateral CU. This result captures the intuition that, once formed, CUs constrain their
members in a way that FTAs do not. Finally, we also nd that the tari¤ restriction imposed
by Article XXIV of the GATT fails to further the cause of global free trade although it
makes the resulting CU more attractive from a global welfare. Thus, our model shows that
the two key di¤erences between FTAs and CUs i.e. the pooling of market power under a
CU and the inability of a CU member to enter into an independent trade agreements with
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outsiders both impose welfare costs on the world trading system but it is only the latter
that prevents the obtainment of free trade.
5 Appendix
5.1 Supporting calculations
Here we report the key formulae that are necessary for proving our results. For an arbitrary
tari¤ vector t = (tij; tik; tji; tjk; tki; tkj), we can write country is welfare as
wi = CSi+ PSi+ TRi;
where consumer surplus in country i equals
CSi =
1
2

(  pIi )2 + (  pJi   tij)2 + (  pKi   tik)2

;
whereas its producer surplus equals
PSi =
(+ 1)
2
(pIi )
2 +
1
2

(pJi + tij)
2 + (pKi + tik)
2

and the tari¤ revenue is given by
TRi =
tij[+ 4tkj   2tij(+ 4)]
+ 6
+
tik[+ 4tjk   2tik(+ 4)]
+ 6
and prices are given by
pIi =
3  2
X
z 6=i
tzi
+ 6
; pJi =
3  2P
z 6=j
tzj
+ 6
; and pKi =
3  2P
z 6=k
tzk
+ 6
Using the above formulae and the optimal tari¤ levels reported in the text, we can easily
calculate welfare levels under all possible trade agreements. To save space, we do not
include the algebraic details underlying these straightforward calculations.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In our model, it is straightforward that no agreement hi is a Nash equilibrium since no
country has an incentive to announce anothers name if the latter does not announce its
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name in return. Which of the other three policy regimes i.e. a bilateral FTA hiji, global
free trade hF i, and a hub and spoke agreement hihi can emerge as Nash equilibria? Note
from inequality (25) that neither member country (i or j) has an incentive to unilaterally
change their announcement that would only lead to no agreement hi. Thus, a bilateral
FTA is a Nash equilibrium. Now consider the hub and spoke regime hihi. From inequalities
(25), (26) and (28), the following is immediate: (i) hub country i has no incentive to
unilaterally change its announcement from fj; kg to fj; g or f; kg or f; g since it would
lead to a deviation from the hub and spoke regime hihi where i is the hub country to hiji or
hiki or hi, respectively; (ii) neither spoke country (say j) has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from its announcement fi; g to f; g or fi; kg since the former deviation would
lead to deviation from hihi where j is a spoke country to hiki where j is a non-member
country while the latter deviation would not lead to any change in the agreement. As a
result, a hub and spoke regime hihi is also a Nash equilibrium. Finally, consider global
free trade hF i. Since world welfare is the highest under hF i, each country prefers hF i to
hi and this result together with (25) implies that a country (say k) has no incentive to
unilaterally deviate from its announcement fi; jg to f; g that would result a deviation
from hF i to hiji:
wk(F   ij) > 0 (48)
Moreover, we know from (29) that a country (say k) has no incentive to unilaterally
change its announcement from fi; jg to fi; g or f; jg since this would mean a deviation
from hF i to hihi or hjhi under both of which country k is a spoke country. Thus, free trade
is also a Nash equilibrium.
To deal with the multiplicity of equilibria described above and to capture the process of
FTA formation in a more realistic fashion, we now isolate Nash equilibria that are coalition
proof (i.e. Nash equilibria that are immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations). We
begin by considering whether global free trade hF i is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
As indicated above, since world welfare is the highest under hF i, each country prefers hF i
to hi and thus we can immediately rule out any coalitional announcement deviations that
would lead to a deviation from hF i to hi. Similarly, we know from (29) that no two
countries (say j and k) have incentives to jointly alter their announcements from fi; kg
to fi; g and fi; jg to fi; g, respectively since it would lead to a deviation from hF i
to hihi where both are spokes (and spokes are worse of relative to free trade). Finally,
taking the announcement of their complement (country k) xed, consider the coalitional
announcement deviation of two countries (say i and j) from their announcements fj; kg
and fi; kg to fj; g and fi; g respectively. This would lead to a coalitional deviation
from free trade hF i to a bilateral FTA hiji. Using the welfare levels reported above, it
is straightforward to show that two countries indeed have a joint incentive to exclude the
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third country from free trade:
wm(F   ij) < 0 (49)
This implies that, taking the announcement of their complement (country k) xed: k =
fi; jg, the above coalitional deviation in announcements would occur. The question then
becomes whether it is a self-enforcing deviation in nature. It would be self enforcing,
if no proper subset of initially deviating countries (neither i nor j) has an incentive to
further alter their announcements from fj; g and fi; g respectively, taking country ks
announcement xed: k = fi; jg. However, given that k = fi; jg, we know from (26)
that country i has an incentive to further deviate from its announcement fj; g to fj; kg
that would lead to a deviation from hiji to hihi where it becomes the hub. Similarly,
country j has an incentive to further deviate from its announcement fi; g to fi; kg so as
to itself become the hub. Thus, the initial coalitional announcement deviation that leads
to a deviation from free trade hF i to a bilateral FTA hiji is not self-enforcing. As a result,
we have shown that free trade is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Next, we consider whether the other agreements are coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
First, consider no agreement hi. Note from (25) that any two countries (say i and j) have
an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from f; g and f; g to fj; g
and fi; g respectively, taking country ks announcement xed: k = f; g. This initial
deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating countries (neither
i nor j) has an incentive to further alter their announcements unilaterally (i.e. hiji is a
Nash equilibrium). Therefore, no agreement hi is not a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
We next examine whether a bilateral FTA hiji is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. It
is immediate from the inequalities in (26) and (28) that countries i and k have incentives
to coalitionally change their announcements from fj; g and f; g to fj; kg and fi; g
respectively, taking country js announcement xed: j = fi; g. This announcement
deviation would convert FTA hiji to the hub and spoke regime hihi where i is the hub and
j and k are spokes. This initial coalitional deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset
of the initially deviating countries (neither i nor k) has an incentive to further alter their
announcements unilaterally (i.e. hihi is a Nash equilibrium). Therefore, a bilateral FTA is
not a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we examine whether a hub and spoke regime (say hihi) is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium. Note from the inequality in (29) that countries j and k have incentives to coali-
tionally change their announcements from fi; g and fi; g to fi; kg and fi; jg respectively,
taking country is announcement xed: i = fj; kg. This announcement deviation would
convert the hub and spoke regime hihi to free trade hF i. This initial coalitional deviation
is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating countries (neither j nor
k) has an incentive to further alter their announcements unilaterally (i.e. hF i is a Nash
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equilibrium). Therefore, a hub and spoke regime is not a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
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